Medicare’s Post-Acute Care Payment:
An Updated Review of the Issues
and Policy Proposals
OVERVIEW

— Medicare spending on post-acute care provided

by home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, inpatient
rehabilitation facilities, and long-term care hospitals accounted for
about 10 percent of total program outlays in 2013. The Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission and others have noted several
long-standing problems with the payment systems for post-acute
care and have suggested refinements to Medicare’s post-acute care
payment systems that are intended to encourage the delivery of
appropriate care in the right setting for a patient’s condition. The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 contained
several provisions that affect the Medicare program’s post-acute
care payment systems, as well as broader payment reforms such
as bundled payment models. Subsequent legislation, including the
Pathway for SGR Reform Act of 2013, the Protecting Access to
Medicare Act of 2014, and the Improving Medicare Post-Acute
Care Transformation Act of 2014, all contain provisions that will
affect future payments to one or more post-acute care providers.
This issue brief describes Medicare’s payment systems for
post-acute care providers, evidence of problems that have been
identified with the payment systems, and policies that have been
proposed or enacted to remedy those problems.
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T

he traditional or fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program
pays for skilled care, therapy, and other services provided
by home health agencies (HHAs), skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs), and long-term
care hospitals (LTCHs), collectively known as post-acute care
(PAC) providers because they typically furnish care after an
inpatient hospital stay. In 2013, FFS Medicare spent $59 billion,
about 10 percent of total program outlays, on post-acute care and
more than double what the program spent in 2001.1 Although
the rate of spending growth for fee-for-service post-acute care
grew more rapidly than other services between 2005 and 2010,
spending growth has slowed or even declined for some sectors
in recent years. This is due in part to the expanded enrollment
of Medicare beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans,2 and
in part to a drop in the number of three-day inpatient hospital
stays that would trigger eligibility for post-acute care in a skilled
nursing facility.3 The decline in spending for post-acute care
is also consistent with a general slowdown in both public and
private sector spending on health care.4
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Medicare uses a prospective payment system for each type of postacute provider. These systems, implemented between 1998 and 2002, set
rates on the basis of historical national average costs for each provider
type. Several problems have plagued these systems, including excessive
payments, imprecise adjustment for differences in patient needs
(known as case mix adjustment), inadequate quality measurement, and
insufficient appropriateness criteria. Multiple changes have been made to
the post-acute care payment systems in law and in regulation since they
were implemented. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (ACA) included reductions5 in annual updates for
inflation, requirements to reduce the HHA payments to better reflect
average costs, a requirement for the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop a value-based purchasing
plan for SNFs and HHAs, and penalties for LTCHs and IRFs that do not
report quality data to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
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(CMS) starting in 2014. More recently, the Pathway for SGR Reform Act
of 2013 phases in a policy that restricts LTCH-level payments to those
patients who meet certain requirements related to the type and duration
of their acute and post-acute care. For all other patients, the Act calls for
Medicare to make payments that are based on the payment an acute care
hospital would receive for the same patient.6

P OS T- ACU T E C A RE I N M EDI C A RE
Broadly defined, post-acute care is skilled nursing care and therapy
provided after an inpatient hospitalization. In some cases, it may shorten
the hospital stay for patients who need ongoing care.7
P rov i d e r s

The four post-acute providers discussed above—home health agencies,
skilled nursing facilities, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, and long-term
care hospitals—provide care to those patients who continue to need
institutional care or otherwise may have difficulty accessing ambulatory
care, but they are not the sole providers of post-hospital care. And not all
Medicare beneficiaries are admitted to these settings after an inpatient
stay. Patients may be admitted directly to an IRF or LTCH without a
preceding hospital stay. A growing share of home health episodes are not
preceded by an inpatient stay. In 2012, 66 percent of home health episodes
were not preceded by an inpatient stay, up from 52 percent in 2001.8

A growing share of
home health episodes
are not preceded by an
inpatient stay.

There were more than 29,000 post-acute care providers in the United
States in 2014: 12,461 HHAs; 15,173 SNFs; 1,177 IRFs; and 422 LTCHs.9 The
numbers of institutional PAC providers have been relatively stable.10
In contrast, the number of HHAs increased substantially with the
introduction of the home health prospective payment system in 2000.
Between 2000 and 2013, the number of HHAs grew by 68 percent.11
Concerns about aberrant patterns of utilization associated with potential
fraud and abuse prompted the Secretary of HHS to exercise her authority
under the ACA to impose a temporary moratorium on the enrollment of
new agencies in parts of Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas.12 Between
2013 and 2014, the number of HHAs decreased by 1.2 percent, with
declines concentrated in Texas and Florida.13
PAC providers are not evenly distributed across the country. Population
concentration and state certificate of need laws affect the number and
location of post-acute care providers. Skilled nursing facilities and home
www.nhpf.org
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health agencies are widely available in every state. There is at least one
IRF in each state and the District of Columbia, but they are concentrated
in populous areas with high concentrations of Medicare beneficiaries.14
Some states have several LTCHs, whereas others have none. In places
without IRFs and LTCHs, patients may be treated in other PAC settings or
in acute care hospitals.
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PAC providers must meet certain conditions to be eligible to receive
Medicare payment. IRFs must meet Medicare conditions of participation15
for acute care hospitals and facility-level criteria that are designed to
provide some assurance that the IRF setting is appropriate for admitted
patients. Sixty percent of cases in a Medicare-certified IRF must have
1 of 13 diagnoses specified by Medicare; this requirement is known as
the 60 percent rule.16 Long-term care hospitals must also meet the same
conditions of participation as acute care hospitals, and their Medicare
patients must have an average length of stay greater than 25 days.17 As
noted, the Pathway for SGR Reform Act imposes additional restrictions,
discussed in greater detail below, on payments to LTCHs based on
beneficiaries’ prior use of inpatient intensive care services and diagnosis
at discharge from the LTCH.
Pa ti e n t s

Home health care is the most commonly used PAC provider, with 3.5
million Medicare users, followed by SNFs with 1.7 million users in 2013.18
Relatively few beneficiaries receive care in IRFs or LTCHs each year due
to the specialized nature of the care they provide, program criteria, and
their lack of availability in certain geographic areas. In 2013, 338,000
beneficiaries received care in an IRF and just 122,000 received care in
an LTCH.19 Patients may use more than one type of post-acute care in
an episode. For example, a person may be discharged from a SNF and
receive home health care upon returning home. In a more unusual
circumstance, a patient might be discharged from a SNF to an IRF when
he or she has regained strength and is able to tolerate the more intensive
therapy provided in an IRF setting.
Medicare requires that beneficiaries meet certain criteria to be eligible
for services provided in some post-acute care settings (TABLE 1, next page).
Up to 100 days of SNF care are covered per spell of illness,20 provided
the beneficiary needs daily skilled nursing or therapy.21 The program
requires at least a three-day inpatient hospital stay in the 30 days prior to
a SNF admission. For Medicare to cover care provided in an IRF, patients
www.nhpf.org
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TABLE 1
Facility and Patient Criteria and Common Conditions by Post-Acute Care Setting
Inpatient
Rehabilitation Facility

Long-Term Care
Hospital

n/a

At least 60 percent
of the facility’s
patients have one
of several specific
medical conditions
that require inpatient
therapy.

Average Medicare
length of stay greater
than 25 days.

Patient needs skilled
nursing services or
skilled rehabilitation
services for the short
term on a daily basis
in an inpatient setting
after an inpatient stay
of 3 or more days.

Patient needs fewer
than 8 hours per day
of intermittent skilled
care.

Patient needs
intensive
rehabilitation
therapy in an
inpatient hospital
environment. Patient
requires and is
expected to benefit
from 3 hours or more
of therapy at least 5
days per week.

n/a

• Joint replacement
• Kidney and

• Diabetes
• Hypertension
• Heart failure
• Skin ulcer
• Osteoarthrosis

• Stroke
• Lower extremity

• Respiratory

Skilled Nursing Facility

Home Health Agency

Facility criteria

n/a

Patient criteria

Commonly treated
diagnoses or
conditions

urinary tract
infections
• Hip and femur
procedures
• Heart failure and
shock
• Pneumonia

Must be unable to
leave home without
considerable effort.

fracture
• Neurological
disorders
• Debility
• Major joint
replacement
• Brain injury

diagnosis with
prolonged
mechanical
ventilation
• Pulmonary edema
and respiratory
failure
• Severe septicemia
or sepsis
• Respiratory
infections and
inflammations
• Skin ulcers with
complications/
comorbidities

Sources: Facility and patient criteria are from Laura Dummit, “Medicare’s Bundling Pilot: Including Post-Acute Care Services,” National Health Policy
Forum, Issue Brief No. 841, March 29, 2011, p. 6, www.nhpf.org/library/details.cfm/2850. Commonly treated diagnoses or conditions are from: Centers
for Medicare & Medicare Services (CMS), Office of Enterprise Data and Analytics (OEDA), Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 2013 edition,
table 7.6 (HHA), “Persons Using Medicare Home Health Agency Services, Visits, Total Charges, Visit Charges, and Program Payments, by Principal
Diagnosis Within Major Diagnostic Classifications (MDCs): Calendar Year 2012,” www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/Downloads/2013_Section7.pdf#Table7.6; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the
Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2015, p. 185 (SNF), www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar2015_entirereport_revised.pdf; MedPAC,
A Data Book: Health Care Spending and the Medicare Program, June 2015, p. 125 (IRF), p. 128 (LTCH), www.medpac.gov/documents/data-book/
june-2015-databook-health-care-spending-and-the-medicare-program.pdf.
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must need and be expected to benefit from intensive rehabilitation
therapy in a hospital environment.22 Patients receiving Medicarecovered home health care generally must be confined to the home
and in need of skilled nursing care on an intermittent basis or have a
continuing need for physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speechlanguage pathology services.23
Although the Medicare program has different coverage criteria and
facility requirements for each PAC setting, there is considerable overlap
in services and expertise across providers. For example, a patient may
receive post-acute care after a hip fracture from an HHA, SNF, or IRF. As
described in the next section, the Medicare program and beneficiaries
face different costs depending on the post-acute care setting in which a
patient is treated. The significant differences in payment amounts in the
absence of clear evidence regarding appropriateness of care or outcomes
have been a concern for policymakers.24
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each PAC setting, there
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Pay m e n t Sy s te m s

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) mandated prospective
payment systems (PPSs) for home health agencies, skilled nursing
facilities, and inpatient rehabilitation facilities. The prospective payment
system for long-term care hospitals was mandated in the Balanced
Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-113) and the Medicare and
Medicaid Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554).
Before prospective payment systems were implemented for post-acute
care providers, each provider was paid its average costs, subject to limits,
for treating Medicare beneficiaries. Enabling legislation and subsequent
rule-making specified the features of the prospective payment systems,
including the unit of service (for example, a discharge, an episode, or a
day of care), the base payment rates (the price Medicare pays for a unit
of service), and the case mix adjustment systems, which raise or lower
the base payment amount depending on the resources required to treat
patients with certain characteristics. The phase-in of the prospective
rates and phase-out of reasonable cost-based payments began for SNFs
in 1998, for HHAs in 2000, for IRFs in January 2002, and for LTCHs in
October 2002.25
Under each PPS, Medicare pays providers a fee that is based on estimates
of the national average cost of providing covered care for a specified
period of time (TABLE 2, next page). In three of the settings, the program
pays for an episode of care; payment for home health care is made in
www.nhpf.org
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TABLE 2: Unit of Payment, Average Payment Amount, and
Length of Stay in Post-Acute Care Settings, 2013
Skilled
Nursing Facility

Home Health
Agency

Inpatient
Rehabilitation Facility

Long-Term
Care Hospital

Unit of Payment

Day

60-day episode

Discharge

Discharge

Average payment
per unit

$11,357
per stay

$2,720
per episode

$18,258
per discharge

$40,070
per discharge

Average
length of stay

27.6 days

1.9 episodes

12.9 days

26.5 days

Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2015, p. 185, 188 (SNF),
p. 221 (HHA), p. 244 (IRF), p. 268 (LTCH), www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar2015_entirereport_revised.pdf.

increments of 60-day episodes, whereas inpatient rehabilitation facilities
and long-term care hospitals are paid per discharge, like acute care
hospitals. For care in a skilled nursing facility, the Medicare program
pays a daily rate that is inclusive of almost all services provided.26
Program payments for each patient are determined by adjusting the
base rates for expected resource needs of the patient (see below) and
geographic variation in wages. Each of the payment systems, except for
the SNF payment system, also has outlier policies that adjust payments
for exceptionally high- or low-cost cases.27
Beneficiaries are responsible for different cost-sharing amounts
depending on the setting in which care is provided. Those receiving
care in a SNF do not pay any cost sharing for the first 20 days. For days
21 to 100, beneficiaries pay a daily copayment equaling one-eighth of
the hospital deductible ($157.50 in 2015).28 Beneficiaries who transfer to
an IRF or LTCH within 60 days of being discharged from an acute care
hospital pay no additional deductible beyond that paid during the acute
care hospital stay. Beneficiaries admitted to an IRF or LTCH from the
community are responsible for a deductible ($1,260 in 2015) at the first
admission during a spell of illness, and for a daily copayment ($315 per
day in 2015) for days 61 through 90.29 Home health care is the only postacute care service that does not require beneficiary cost sharing. MedPAC
has recommended numerous times that the program add a requirement
for beneficiary copayments for home health episodes that are not
preceded by a hospitalization or other use of post-acute care. President
Obama’s 2016 budget proposed a copayment of $100 for home health
episodes with five or more visits not preceded by a hospital or other
inpatient post-acute care stay beginning in 2019.30
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S p e n din g

Medicare fee-for-service spending for post-acute care totaled $59 billion
in 2013 or about 10 percent of total program expenditures of $583 billion.31
SNF payments of $28.8 billion accounted for nearly half of PAC dollars
and 5 percent of total Medicare spending.32 In that same year, home health
care spending was $17.9 billion or about 3 percent of Medicare spending.33
At $6.8 billion for IRFs and $5.5 billion for LTCHs, spending in these two
sectors combined accounted for 2 percent of total program outlays.34
Between 2003 and 2013, spending on post-acute care increased 74 percent
(FIGURE 1).35 Spending doubled for LTCHs and SNFs and increased by 77
percent and 10 percent, respectively, for HHAs and IRFs.36 A variety of
factors account for increased spending on PAC services. Home health
spending growth has been driven by an increase in the number of
agencies, the number of users, and the number of episodes per user, as
well as a shift in the mix of services used away from home health aide
visits toward more costly skilled nursing and therapy visits.37 Spending
on SNF services has not been driven by more users or more days of care,
but mostly by an increase in the intensity of services, primarily therapy.38

FIGURE 1
Medicare Spending on Post-Acute Care, 2003 to 2013
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Source: Mark E. Miller, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Medicare Post-Acute Care Reforms,” statement before the Subcommittee on Health,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, April 16, 2015, p. 2, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/20150416/103327/
HHRG-114-IF14-Wstate-MillerM-20150416.pdf.
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P OS T- ACU T E C A RE P O L I C Y A N D PAY M EN T S YS T EM S :
P RO BLEM S A N D REM EDIES
MedPAC, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others
have identified several problematic features of Medicare post-acute care
policies and payment systems and their effect on care delivery, including:
• difficulty determining the appropriate post-acute care setting;
• payments considerably in excess of provider costs;
• case mix measures that do not accurately adjust payments for
differences in the costs of treating different categories of patients;
retrospective adjustments that incent greater use of therapy services;
and threshold policies that encourage timing of discharges to
maximize reimbursements; and
• uniform payment for care regardless of appropriateness or quality.
Recommended payment changes to address these problems include:
recalculating the base payment rates (also known as rebasing) to ensure
that payments are more in line with providers’ costs); gainsharing (a
process for sharing a portion of savings generated from efficiencies with
providers) to encourage providers to be more efficient; modifying case mix
measures to more accurately reflect the costs of treating different types of
patients; moving toward a unified payment system for PAC services that
would be based on patient characteristics rather than the site of care; and
bundling payments. Some of these changes to the prospective payment
systems to improve payment accuracy and care delivery have been made
in law or in regulation, whereas others have not been adopted. This
section discusses some of the problems with the post-acute care PPSs and
the major recommendations to address these problems.
Dif f i cul t y D e te r minin g A p p ro p ria te S e t tin g

Despite Medicare’s attempt to define criteria for appropriate use of
different PAC provider types, there are no definitive guidelines on
determining which patients need or would benefit from PAC services.39
Furthermore, distinctions between settings are unclear and evidence
is lacking regarding which settings are best for treating which types of
conditions. Not surprisingly, patients with similar needs are treated in
different settings. As a result, there is wide geographic variation in both
utilization and spending for PAC services. Comparing the highest-use to
the lowest-use areas of the country, MedPAC found that post-acute care
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spending varied eight-fold; spending for inpatient hospitals, in contrast,
varied only 60 percent. Spending also varied three-fold for conditions
that typically use PAC services.40 These data suggest that patients in some
areas may be treated in higher-intensity and more expensive settings than
they need, and other patients may receive unneeded PAC services.
Researchers have examined characteristics of patients treated in different
settings and looked at whether their outcomes are different. Through
comparisons of patient risk profiles, market conditions where facilities
were located, and patient outcomes, MedPAC has shown that LTCH
patients cannot be clearly distinguished from chronically critically ill
(CCI) patients receiving care in acute care hospitals and some SNFs.41
Although care for CCI patients in LTCHs is more expensive, studies have
“failed to find a clear advantage in outcomes for LTCH users.”42 In areas
without LTCHs, CCI patients are treated in SNFs or IRFs, or with longer
stays in acute care hospitals, which suggests that medically complex
patients can be treated appropriately in other settings. The treatment of
certain CCI patients in LTCHs may also introduce distortions to the acute
care hospital PPS, potentially causing payment rates that are too low for
complex patients treated in acute care hospitals in areas where LTCHs
aren’t available.43
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In an attempt to differentiate LTCH patients from those who could be
treated in acute care hospitals, Congress included a provision in the
Pathway for SGR Reform Act of 2013 restricting LTCH-level payments.
Beginning in October 2015, LTCH-level payments will be made only for
patients whose transfer to the LTCH was preceded by at least a three-day
stay in an acute care hospital intensive care unit (ICU), or whose diagnosis
at discharge from the LTCH indicates that they received mechanical
ventilation services for at least 96 hours. Patients not meeting the threeday ICU stay or ventilation threshold will be paid at a rate comparable
to that paid to an acute care hospital. 44 This threshold is considerably
less than an eight-day stay threshold recommended by MedPAC in 2014
and 2015.45 To address the issue of underpayment for some CCI patients
in acute care hospitals, MedPAC has also proposed allocating funds that
would have gone to LTCHs to the hospital PPS outlier pool.46
MedPAC has also examined the potential overlap of patients in SNFs
and IRFs and concluded that, for 22 conditions frequently treated
in both settings, there is little difference in patient characteristics or
outcomes.47 On the basis of these findings, MedPAC has recommended
that for selected conditions, “the IRF base payment rate be set equal to
the average SNF payment per discharge for each condition.”48 Other
www.nhpf.org
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IRF payments would not be affected, and IRFs would not be required to
comply with current regulations dealing with intensity and service mix
for these conditions. President Obama’s 2016 budget for HHS included
a proposal to equalize payment for some conditions commonly treated
in IRFs and SNFs. A second proposal in the budget would adjust the
standard for classifying a facility as an IRF by requiring that 75 percent
of cases admitted to an IRF, rather than 60 percent, have at least 1 of the
13 conditions as currently required. This change would encourage IRFs to
avoid admitting low-acuity patients who may receive appropriate care in
other, lower-cost settings.49
Another avenue of post-acute care payment reform, sometimes referred
to as site-neutral payment, would integrate individual PPSs and pay
for care on the basis of patient rather than facility characteristics.50 To
understand costs and outcomes across different post-acute care sites and
the feasibility of integrated post-acute care payment systems, Congress
directed the Secretary of HHS to establish a demonstration program
under section 5008 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171)
by January 2008.51 The Post-Acute Care Payment Reform Demonstration
(PAC-PRD) was conducted over three years, and findings were released
in a report to the Congress in January 2012.52 It used a standardized
patient assessment instrument, called the Continuity Assessment Record
and Evaluation (CARE) tool, to collect data at discharge from acute care
hospitals and at admission and discharge from post-acute care sites.
The demonstration analyzed factors that can help predict costs53 in each of
the different post-acute care sites, but developing an entirely new payment
system was beyond the scope of the project. The demonstration focused
on “creating a solid basis from which a payment system could potentially
be built in the future and [providing] information on the extent it seemed
advisable to proceed with development of a system that could cover
more than one PAC setting.”54 Among the demonstration’s key findings
were that “evidence supports the potential for development of a common
payment system for the three inpatient post-acute care settings: LTCHs,
IRFs, and SNFs,” but that “a payment model combining home health with
the other types of PAC providers is not supported by the analysis.”55
Building on the PAC-PRD, the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care
Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 requires post-acute care providers
to begin collecting uniform assessment data in 2018. After two years
of data collection, the Secretary is required to recommend a uniform
payment system for post-acute care. The IMPACT Act also charges
MedPAC with developing a prototype prospective payment system
www.nhpf.org
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encompassing all PAC settings using the data previously collected under
the PAC-PRD. MedPAC’s report is due in 2016.56
While these proposals create incentives to place patients in appropriate
lower-cost settings, they do not address the question of whether someone
should be receiving PAC services at all. An episode payment that
bundles payments for a hospitalization and any necessary PAC would
create incentives for the provider receiving the payment to deliver only
necessary PAC services in the lowest cost settings. MedPAC recommended
testing bundled payment of PAC services in 2008 and has examined a
variety of bundled payment designs in the ensuing years.57 The ACA
mandated that HHS test bundled PAC payments, and the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) is mounting a demonstration
of different models of bundling known as the Bundled Payment for
Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative.58 Rather than a single payment to
one provider, BPCI involves usual payments to all providers serving a
beneficiary and one provider able to earn shared savings if the total can be
reduced below a targeted level. A similar approach is used in the hospital
value-based purchasing proposal, where hospitals have an incentive to
lower spending in the 30 days following discharge. Bundled payments
do create a clear incentive for coordinating care and lowering episode
costs, but those lower costs may result from greater efficiency through
delivering only necessary, lowest-cost services or by stinting on needed
services. Bundled payments will need to be accompanied by sufficient
oversight and accountability to ensure patients’ needs are being met.59
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Pay m e n t s We ll in E xce s s of P rov i d e r s’ C o s t s

Medicare net revenue or profit margins, calculated using data from
providers’ cost reports, are a measure of program spending relative
to the costs of treating beneficiaries. Average Medicare margins of
post-acute care providers are high and have been for many years,
particularly in HHAs and SNFs (FIGURE 2, next page). High margins, along
with other indicators of Medicare payment adequacy, had led MedPAC
to recommend for several years that the Congress eliminate the annual
inflation updates for SNFs, HHAs, IRFs, and LTCHs. The ACA included
provisions to reduce the market basket updates for all post-acute care
providers. They involved (i) productivity adjustments to the annual
inflation updates in all four PAC settings, and (ii) a fixed percentage point
reduction to the inflation updates for HHAs, IRFs, and LTCHs for multiple
years. With the exception of IRFs, all PAC providers saw declines in their
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2013 Medicare margins as a result of such payment changes. Nevertheless,
because indicators continue to signal more-than-adequate Medicare
payments, MedPAC recommended no market basket updates for 2016.60
MedPAC has also recommended that the home health and SNF payment
systems be rebased to better align Medicare payments and providers’
costs. Generally, payment systems may need to be rebased when there is
evidence that the nature or mix of the services provided have changed
since the base rates were initially determined. Home health patients now
receive fewer visits and a different mix of services than when the rates
were established using cost data from 1997, contributing to significant
overpayment.61 The growth in SNF margins was driven by a growing
concentration of days in the highest paying case mix groups (discussed
more below), where payments grew even more than providers’ costs.62

FIGURE 2: Medicare Margins by Post-Acute Care Sector, 2006 to 2013
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Note: Margins for SNFs and HHAs are for freestanding facilities; margins for IRFs and LTCHs are for all facilities.
Sources: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2015,
www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar2015_entirereport_revised.pdf; and MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Impact of Home Health
Payment Rebasing on Beneficiary Access to and Quality of Care, December 2014, p. 7, http://medpac.gov/documents/reports/december2014-report-to-the-congress-impact-of-home-health-payment-rebasing-on-beneficiary-access-to-and-quality-of-care.pdf.

www.nhpf.org

13

NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM

OCTOBER 5, 2015

The ACA mandated that the home health PPS be rebased between
2014 and 2017, but the effect of rebasing is partially offset by payment
updates.63 Although the ACA requires a rebasing reduction of 3.5 percent,
payment updates and growth in the size of the base rate will result in
a net cumulative reduction in payments of only about 2 percent for an
industry that has experienced annual double-digit margins for many
years, according to MedPAC estimates.64 The ACA did not require
rebasing the SNF PPS.65
High average Medicare margins have raised some concerns, but so
have the distributions of those margins. The high averages are the
result of some HHAs and SNFs having margins well above the average,
whereas others fall far below and may incur losses. In 2013, over onequarter of HHAs and SNFs had Medicare margins in excess of 21.5
percent, 70 percent higher than the average. At the other extreme, the
margins for providers in the lowest quartile were -3.4 percent or lower
for freestanding HHAs and 3.7 percent or lower for freestanding SNFs.66
These distributions raise questions about the underlying cause for the
variation in financial performance, and whether it is due to differences in
provider efficiency, patient populations, or the quality of care delivered—
aspects that are difficult to measure.
The range of margins also raises concerns about rebasing as the
mechanism to reduce average margins. Rebasing will likely be successful
in changing that average, but it simply shifts the distribution. Some
HHAs and some SNFs will earn margins well in excess of the average,
indicating that Medicare pays too much. Some HHAs and some SNFs
will incur larger losses. To the extent those losses reflect inadequate
adjustment of Medicare payment rates to reflect the needs of patients
being served, care for those patients may be jeopardized. Gainsharing
has been suggested as an alternative to rebasing.67 It could reduce
average margins as well as affect the distribution of margins because
both higher profits and larger losses are shared between Medicare and
providers. Incentives that come from prospective payment for providers
to minimize costs would be reduced somewhat, but gainsharing provides
some protection for patients while there is uncertainty about whether the
prospective rates adequately reflect patients’ needs.
C a s e M i x Adju s tm e n t

Prospective payments to PAC providers are adjusted for patient acuity and
services provided, also called case mix. Case mix systems (i) categorize
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patients into groups that are expected to have similar resource use based
on patient characteristics and (ii) adjust base rates up or down to pay for
the cost of care to each patient type. With accurate case mix adjustment,
providers would be indifferent to the acuity and resource needs of the
patient, which is important to ensuring access for all types of patients
under a prospective payment system. If case mix systems fail to accurately
categorize patients, or are based on characteristics that are subjective and
can be manipulated by providers, certain patients become more or less
profitable which could lead providers to prefer some types of patients and
to over- or under-provide services. Inadequate case mix adjustment may
also be a factor in the wide distribution of margins discussed above.
Medicare’s case mix systems for the four PAC settings adjust payments
on the basis of some generally similar characteristics (TABLE 3), such
as functional status (for example, the ability to walk or dress), clinical
conditions, and amount of therapy. But the case mix systems are still
distinct from each other and use different specific patient characteristics
and metrics. Medicare requires SNFs, HHAs, and IRFs—but not LTCHs—

TABLE 3: Post-Acute Care Case Mix Systems, by Setting
Inpatient
Rehabilitation Facility

Long-Term Care
Hospital

Home Health
Resource Groups

Case Mix Groups

Medicare Severity
Long-Term Care
Diagnosis Related
Groups

66

153

92

753

Patient
characteristics that
determine case mix
group

• Minutes of therapy

• Number of therapy

• Reason for

• Principal and

Patient assessment
instrument

MDS

OASIS

IRF-PAI

none

Skilled Nursing Facility

Home Health Agency

Case mix system
name

Resource Utilization
Groups

Number of case mix
groups

per week
• Functional status
• Clinical conditions
• Other services like
respiratory therapy
or specialized
feeding

visits per episode
• Functional status
• Clinical conditions

rehabilitation
• Age
• Cognitive and
functional status
• Comorbidities

secondary
diagnoses
• Procedures
• Age
• Sex
• Discharge status

Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Payment Basics for skilled nursing facility and home health agency services, October
2014, http://medpac.gov/-documents-/payment-basics; MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2014, p. 246 (IRF),
http://medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar14_entirereport.pdf; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, LTC-DRG Files: in FY2015 MS-LTC-DRG
File, “Table 11, MS-LTC-DRGS, Relative Weights, Geometric Average Length of Stay, Short-Stay Outlier (SSO) Threshold, and ‘IPPS Comparable
Threshold’ for Discharges Occurring From October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2015 under the LTCH PPS,” www.cms.gov/Medicare/MedicareFee-for-Service-Payment/LongTermCareHospitalPPS/ltcdrg.html.
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to use a patient assessment instrument specific to each setting for
assigning patients to case mix groups. The IMPACT Act of 2014, however,
requires PAC providers to begin collecting uniform assessment data
beginning in 2018. These data are intended to provide the foundation for
the development of a uniform payment system for PAC services.68 They
could, for example, be used to develop a common case mix system that
could be used to align payments across PAC settings.
T herapy Payment in Home Health and SNF Payment Systems

Home health and SNF payments vary with the amount of therapy
provided; they are not determined prospectively. MedPAC has found
that the increased payments for patients in higher case mix groups
(where patients get more therapy) more than cover the providers’ costs of
providing that additional therapy.69
Because payments are determined by the amount of therapy
provided, and not by the expected need for therapy based on patients’
characteristics, this creates an incentive and an opportunity to furnish
therapy that may exceed a patient’s needs in order to receive additional
payments. Home health and skilled nursing facility providers have
responded to these incentives by shifting patients to higher payment
therapy case mix groups over time. For example, FIGURE 3 shows that SNF
case mix has changed between 2006 and 2012, such that the percentage of

FIGURE 3: Share of SNF Patient Days in Therapy, by Intensity of Case Mix Groups
2012
2011
2010

Source: Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS),
Office of Enterprise Data
and Analytics (OEDA),
Medicare and Medicaid
Statistics Supplement,
2007-2013 editions, table 6.9
(2008-2013 editions) and
table 6.9b (2007 edition),

2009
2008
2007

Low
Ultra High

2006
0

Very High
20

High
40

None

Medium
60

80

100

www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-andReports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/index.html.

Percent
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total patient days in therapy has grown overall, and the share of therapy
days in the “ultra high” case mix groups has increased substantially.
According to MedPAC, this shift to more intensive therapy days is not
explained by changes in the health status of beneficiaries receiving
care in SNFs.70 The Office of the Inspector General in HHS also found
that therapy care provided to SNF patients was not related to patient
characteristics.71 Since the implementation of the SNF payment system,
CMS has revised the way it pays for therapy delivered in groups or
delivered concurrently and added a requirement for patients to be
reassessed (and for payment to be adjusted accordingly) when therapy is
discontinued or when the amount of therapy increases or decreases. Even
with these changes, the incentive to furnish therapy to achieve higher
payments remains part of the SNF payment system.72
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The changes in home
health case mix also
illustrate providers’
responsiveness to therapy
payment policy.

The changes in home health case mix also illustrate providers’
responsiveness to therapy payment policy. From 2001 to 2007, episodes
with ten or more therapy visits received a higher payment than those
with fewer than ten therapy visits.73 During this period the number
of episodes with ten therapy visits grew.74 In 2008, CMS changed the
therapy payment policy to lower payments for episodes with 10 to 13
therapy visits and increase payments for episodes with 6 to 9 and 14 or
more therapy visits.75 Subsequently, providers delivered fewer episodes
with 10 to 13 therapy visits and more episodes with 6 to 9 and 14 or more
therapy visits, resulting in the “largest one year shift in therapy volume
since the PPS was implemented.”76 In 2011, CMS added a requirement for
HHAs to review the need for therapy at points throughout the episode,
and increased payments for non-therapy episodes and lowered payments
for therapy episodes. Despite these changes, payments are still higher for
therapy patients, and over 90 percent of the increase in episode volume
since 2008 is attributable to episodes with six or more therapy visits.77
MedPAC has recommended that Medicare discontinue using the amount
of therapy as a factor in the home health and skilled nursing facility PPSs.
It suggested that the payment systems instead use patient characteristics
that predict therapy needs to set payment.78
In addition to changes to the way therapy is factored into the case mix
systems, MedPAC and others have recommended further refinements to
case mix systems to improve the accuracy of Medicare’s PAC payments.
For example, although SNF payments in aggregate more than cover
providers’ costs, the SNF payment system does not accurately target
payment for certain non-therapy ancillary services, such as expensive
prescription drugs and parenteral feeding.79 GAO and MedPAC have
www.nhpf.org
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recommended that the payment system be refined to address this, both to
avoid access problems for patients needing such services and to prevent
under-provision of these services in SNFs.80 CMS has made some changes
to the SNF case mix system over time, but MedPAC has found these
refinements inadequate to target payments properly for patients who
need non-therapy ancillary services.
S h o r t- St ay Di s cha rg e T h re s h o l d s fo r LTC H s

Changes in the timing of discharges after implementation of the
prospective payment system for LTCHs in fiscal year (FY) 2002 also
illustrate providers’ responsiveness to payment incentive changes. A
“short-stay” outlier policy was included as part of the PPS under which
LTCHs were paid substantially less—less than half, in some cases—for
patients discharged before a DRG-specific length-of-stay threshold. A
recent analysis81 of lengths of stay for patients with a respiratory system
diagnosis needing prolonged mechanical ventilation found that, before
implementation of the PPS, lengths of stay were evenly distributed
before and after the short-stay threshold. After implementation of the
short-stay threshold, however, very few live patients “were discharged
before the short-stay threshold, and there was a significant increase in
the percentage of discharges on or immediately after the threshold.”82
Discharges of patients who died did not follow this pattern. MedPAC
has discussed changes to LTCH payment policy that would reduce the
payment cliff associated with failing to cross the short-stay threshold,83
but the study’s authors remain skeptical of the efficacy of any policy that
relies on length-of-stay thresholds to determine payment amounts.
Q u ali t y M ea s u re m e n t a n d Pay m e n t

Medicare’s post-acute care PPSs do not currently pay on the basis of the
quality of care provided. However, the ACA, the Protecting Access to
Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA), and the IMPACT Act all contain provisions
that require one or more post-acute care providers to report on quality
measures and impose financial penalties for not doing so. The ACA, for
example, mandated CMS to require LTCHs and IRFs to report quality
data by 2014 or face a 2 percent reduction in the applicable market basket
update. Data collection for three LTCH quality measures began October 1,
2012, and data collection for two additional measures related to influenza
vaccinations for patients and staff began January 1, 2014. Payment updates
in 2016 and beyond will be affected by reporting on these measures.84 In
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2015, LTCHS will be required to report on two types of facility-acquired
infections with consequences for payment updates beginning in FY 2017.
Also beginning in FY 2017, CMS will begin calculating LTCHs’ all-cause
unplanned readmission rates to acute care hospitals. Four more measures
will be added in FY 2018, bringing the total number of LTCH quality
measures to 12.85 In 2015 IRFs are required to report on two adverse
events and additional quality measures related to influenza vaccinations
for health care workers and patients.86 Depending on the measure,
payment updates will be affected in FY 2016 or FY 2017.
The 2014 IMPACT Act required a quality reporting program for SNFs.
According to CMS, the program will use measures related to skin
integrity, incidence of major falls, and functional and cognitive status.
Reporting on these measures will begin in FY 2018.87 PAMA required the
Secretary to develop a potentially preventable readmission measure for
SNFs who must begin publicly reporting on the measure in October 2017.
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Measuring quality in
PAC settings is difficult
for a number of reasons,
including lack of data
on outcomes of care and
because some patients
will not regain function
or recuperate from their
illness.

Home health agencies were required by the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005 to submit data from the Outcome and Assessment Information Set
(OASIS) to the Secretary, which would allow for the assessment of quality
of care. A 2012 report by the HHS Office of the Inspector General critical
of CMS’s oversight of HHAs’ compliance with reporting requirements
led to the development of a new pay-for-reporting program. Beginning
July 2015, HHAs that fail to meet a reporting threshold will see a 2
percent reduction in their market basket updates.88
Some PAC providers’ future payments will also be adjusted based on
their actual performance on various measures. The ACA required CMS
to develop a plan to pay SNFs and HHAs for the quality of care they
provide to Medicare beneficiaries. PAMA requires the Secretary to
implement a value-based purchasing program by 2019 that would adjust
a SNF’s payments on the basis of its readmission rate.89 This proposal is
based on MedPAC research showing that 15 percent of Medicare patients
discharged from a hospital to a SNF experience potentially avoidable
readmissions to the hospital, either during their SNF stay or within 30
days after discharge.90
Measuring quality in PAC settings is difficult for a number of reasons
including lack of data on outcomes of care. It is also difficult because
some patients receiving post-acute care will not regain function or
recuperate from their illness. For this reason, adequate risk adjustment
is key to making fair comparisons across providers and for avoiding
penalizing providers who treat patients unlikely to recover from their
www.nhpf.org
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condition. Creating financial incentives in the payment systems to
improve quality of care may be especially difficult in a sector with such
high Medicare margins. Providers can easily absorb small payment
penalties or may not be motivated by rewards that are small in
comparison to their profit margins. These dynamics may shift, however,
if the size of penalties increases and as episode-based bundled payments
for PAC services become more prevalent.

LO O K I N G A HE A D
Although spending on post-acute care has slowed of late, that
slowdown reflects broader health care spending trends and only
minimally reflects refinement of Medicare PAC policies. Long-standing
problems with Medicare’s payment systems for PAC providers persist:
case mix systems poorly target payments and are easily manipulated,
base rates set the level of payment too high, and data on risk-adjusted
outcomes and appropriateness are lacking. For these reasons, MedPAC
has frequently recommended the elimination of payment updates for
PAC providers, urged CMS to rebase payments for some services, and
called for moving toward a unified system that would peg payments
to patient characteristics rather than sites of care. MedPAC has also
recommended intermediate steps such as “aligned readmission policies
[that] would hold PAC providers and hospitals jointly responsible for
the care they furnish.”91
Some have argued that adopting site-neutral payment, which MedPAC
proposes for a limited number of conditions frequently treated in SNFs
and IRFs, is simply a stop-gap measure until there is a more wholesale
adoption of broader reforms such as bundled payment mandated by
the ACA.92 The number of providers willing to go “at-risk” under the
BPCI initiative has been limited, however, and few have taken on a full
complement of episodes. Bundled payment models are still in their
infancy and present conceptual and operational challenges that must be
resolved before they can be fully adopted.93 Efforts to impose value-based
purchasing rubrics on PAC providers are also at the very early stages of
implementation. The current payment systems will continue to be the
dominant payment models while broader reforms are being developed
and tested. Refinements to the post-acute care PPSs recommended by
MedPAC and others could be pursued to reduce spending growth,
redistribute payments within payment systems to better target payments
to costs, and ensure that the program is purchasing quality PAC services.
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Such refinements could improve the post-acute care prospective payment
systems and could strengthen the foundation on which to build broader
payment reforms.
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